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ABSTRACT 
Design by Contract (DbC) is a software development methodology that focuses on 
clearly defining the interfaces between components to produce better quality object-
oriented software. The idea behind DbC is that a method defines a contract stating the 
requirements a client needs to fulfill to use it, the precondition, and the properties it 
ensures after its execution, the postcondition. Though there exists ample support for DbC 
for sequential programs, applying DbC to concurrent programs presents several 
challenges. Using Java as the target programming language, this paper tackles such 
challenges by augmenting the Java Modelling Language (JML) and modifying the JML 
compiler to generate Runtime Assertion Checking (RAC) code to support DbC in 
concurrent programs.  
We applied our solution in a carefully designed case study on a highly concurrent 
industrial software system from the telecommunications domain to assess the 
effectiveness of contracts as test oracles in detecting and diagnosing functional faults in 
concurrent software. Based on these results, clear and objective requirements are defined 
for contracts to be effective test oracles for concurrent programs whilst balancing the 
effort to design them. Main results include that contracts of a realistic level of 
completeness and complexity can detect around 76% of faults and reduce the diagnosis 
effort for such faults by at least ten times. We, therefore, show that DbC can not only be 
applied to concurrent software but can also be a valuable tool to improve the economics 
of software engineering. 
Keywords 
Design by contract, concurrency, object-oriented programming, Java, Java Modelling 
Language, verification, runtime assertion checking, fault detection, fault diagnosis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Including specifications of program behaviour together with the source code is not a new 
idea. Design-by-Contract (DbC) (Meyer, 1992) is one of the most elaborate software 
development methodologies that put such idea into practice, with Eiffel being the best-
known example of a programming language that supports it. Following DbC principles, a 
method defines a contract stating the requirements a client needs to fulfill to use it, the 
precondition, and the properties it ensures after its execution, the postcondition. Contracts 
can be treated as logical assertions (contract assertions) about the state of a program at a 
certain point. A program can be instrumented with code that checks the validity of the 
assertions at runtime and upon failure throws an exception indicating where it happened. 
DbC also defines object invariants (Müller et al., 2006)1, properties that must hold in all 
visible states of an object. The visible states of an object are the states just after object 
construction, just before/after a visible method2 execution. Behavioural subtyping 
(America, 1987, 1990; Leavens and Weihl, 1995; Liskov and Wing, 1994; Raghavan and 
Gary, 2000) is an integral part of DbC. A subtype automatically inherits the specification 
(contracts and invariants) from its super-types (Dhara and Leavens, 1996; Leavens, 2006; 
Leavens and Naumann, 2006). The effective precondition of a method is the disjunction 
of all the inherited preconditions and the method’s declared preconditions. The effective 
postcondition is the conjunction of all inherited postconditions for which the associated 
precondition is satisfied and the method’s declared postconditions if associated 
preconditions are satisfied. The effective class invariant is the conjunction of all inherited 
class invariants with the object’s declared invariant. This guarantees that a subtype can be 
properly used in place of its super-type(s). 
Most work on DbC focused on sequential programs, and applying DbC to concurrent 
programs presents several challenges. The first challenge is interference, the product of 
multiple threads of execution modifying and accessing shared state. Interference occurs 
                                                            
1 Meyer originally named them class invariants but we prefer the term object invariant since it is an 
invariant about an object. 
2 Typically non-private methods are considered visible. However, this varies with the specification 
language. See section 3.1 for the specific meaning in the context of the Java Modeling Language. 
Carleton University, Technical Report SCE-13-04 September 2013 
4 
even on correct programs with respect to concurrency control. Basically, interference for 
a method’s precondition happens when the Run-time Assertion Checking (RAC) code is 
evaluated at a point in time after which other threads are allowed to modify the objects 
referenced in such assertions but prior to the point at which these objects are accessed by 
the method in question. This causes RAC code to report errors for correct methods and 
vice-versa. The problem is analogous with respect to postconditions and invariants. The 
second challenge is the specification and verification of thread-safety properties (i.e., 
which objects are safe to be accessed by an executing thread) using contract assertions. It 
is common practice to have methods in a concurrent class (informally) specify which 
locks the client is required to hold prior to executing such methods, which locks the 
method is going to (potentially) acquire during its execution, and, in some cases, the 
order in which they must be acquired to avoid deadlocks (Weikum and Vossen, 2002). 
From a specification perspective, these safety properties have been typically associated 
with preconditions, therefore allowing subtypes to strengthen (e.g., require more locks to 
be acquired) or weaken (e.g., require fewer locks to be acquired) the precondition. This 
may cause unexpected behaviour with respect to such safety properties as discussed in 
(Araujo et al., 2008). From a verification perspective, the instrumented version of a 
sequential system can be used in place of the original one and the results obtained during 
verification activities will be valid for the original system. This is not necessarily the case 
for concurrent systems, in which changes in the execution time of different threads due to 
the introduction of the RAC code may affect the execution paths a program takes, 
therefore preventing certain failures from happening whilst forcing others to occur.  
Instrumenting contract assertions requires tool support. The Java Programming Language 
(Arnold et al., 2000) does not provide native support for DbC. It only provides basic 
support for assertions through the assert keyword, which simply causes an exception 
to be thrown in case a given Boolean expression evaluates to false. This work uses the 
Java Modeling Language (JML) (Leavens et al., 2006; Leavens et al., 2009) as the 
specification language used to write contracts. JML allows the specification of properties 
from simple assertions (lightweight properties) about pointer null-ness to complete 
functional correctness of program components (strong properties). JML is a behavioural 
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interface specification language with which one can specify the syntactic and behavioural 
interface of a portion of Java code3. It also includes notations for pre- and postconditions, 
invariants, and offers mechanisms for specification inheritance, thus providing support 
for DbC. JML has a Java-like syntax and JML specifications can even perform method 
calls. It also provides a rich set of model classes (i.e., classes that can only be used in 
specifications) to construct rich abstract descriptions of program behaviour. The JML 
toolset comes with a compiler that translates JML specifications into RAC code, 
producing Java classes instrumented with executable assertions. The JML compiler 
(Cheon and Leavens, 2002) produces RAC code that enforces DbC and behavioural 
subtyping. 
One of the purposes of developing techniques to extend DbC to concurrent programs is to 
instrument such programs with oracles from contracts. Creating test oracles is time-
consuming, error prone (Beizer, 1990; Staats et al., 2011), and represents a significant 
portion of the testing effort and probably even more so for concurrent programs. 
Automatically deriving test oracles from contracts through the generation of executable 
assertions is an attempt to address these issues. Crafting contracts, however, also requires 
effort and is subject to errors and this is why it must be supported by a specification 
language like JML enabling their definition at a higher level of abstraction. It is also 
important, from a practical standpoint, to determine what should be the level of detail and 
content of such contracts, i.e., the effort put into writing contracts, to enable such task to 
be as cost-effective as possible. 
The JML compiler (jmlc) originally provided support for generating RAC code for 
sequential programs. One important contribution of our work is that we extended JML 
with new specification constructs to address the above-mentioned problems and modified 
the JML compiler to generate RAC code for these constructs as well as other concurrency 
related constructs (Rodríguez et al., 2005a) which had never been implemented in a RAC 
scenario (Araujo et al., 2011a).  
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In earlier work reported in conference venues, we addressed the objectives of (1) 
creating contracts specifying concurrency properties as well as functional properties 
in a concurrent environment (Araujo et al., 2008), implementing them in a compiler to 
generate instrumented code, and (2) verifying that an instrumented system can be 
used in place of its production version (Araujo et al., 2011a). In the current paper, 
based on a large-scale industrial case study involving a highly concurrent software 
product of the telecommunications industry, we assess whether such contracts can help 
detect a high number of faults and significantly reduce diagnosis effort. In summary, 
our goal is to provide a practical solution, supported by evidence, to the problem of 
applying Design by Contract to concurrent object-oriented software, with an emphasis 
on the Java programming language and JML.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work. Section 
3 introduces the concept of concurrent contracts and how they address the problems 
of interference and thread-safety, a summary of our previous work. It also briefly 
introduces JML, focusing on the constructs required to understand this work. Section 
4 summarizes our previous work on implementing a concurrent RAC for JML and 
assessing the validity of system testing results performed with it. Section 5 presents 
an extensive industrial case study, which leads to a set of recommendations regarding 
the contents of concurrent contracts (section 6) so that they can be effective and 
efficient test oracles with respect to functional faults in the context of concurrent 
systems. We conclude in section 7. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Verification of concurrency properties of programs can be divided into three kinds of 
approaches. Static checking uses the source code only (usually augmented with some 
annotations) to check the validity of certain properties. Dynamic checking uses only 
information available during runtime execution of the program under test. There are also 
approaches that combine both techniques. Our work concentrates on dynamic checking. 
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Atomizer (Flanagan and Freund, 2004) is a dynamic checker for Java programs. It checks 
for atomicity: “A method is atomic if its execution is not affected by and does not 
interfere with the concurrently executing threads.” Agrawal et al. (Agrawal et al., 2005) 
combine runtime and static analyses to check for atomicity. Both solutions have a 
common limitation intrinsic to dynamic checking: they require that the code be exercised 
to be checked. Atomicity checking relies on annotations to determine the set of locks 
protecting access to a variable (which is possibly flawed), or relies on lock inference 
algorithms. Lock inference requires multiple executions of a method (or block of code in 
general) being checked for atomicity, and therefore does not fit well with a RAC-based 
approach to verification since the latter depends on a predicate which is expected to yield 
an answer in every execution. Atomicity, therefore, is to be established prior to executing 
functional contracts. Unfortunately, atomicity does not prevent interference as we have 
defined it earlier and thus cannot be combined with RAC. A similar problem happens 
with pattern-based concurrent bug detection (Park et al., 2010).  
Rodríguez et al. (Rodríguez et al., 2005b) present solutions to the problem of specifying 
lock acquisition and thread-safety properties in JML but fail to consider the issue of 
inheritance. Although they propose several constructs, none of them were implemented in 
the JML toolset. We implemented all the constructs we propose on the JML compiler and 
generate RAC code for them (Araujo et al., 2011a). 
Jacobs et al. (Jacobs et al., 2005) present a methodology based on object and thread 
ownership in which a thread must own an object to access any of its fields. This implies 
that preconditions and postconditions only refer to thread-safe fields. In other words, the 
internal behaviour of the object cannot be specified in several (possibly important) cases. 
Our approach solves this issue with the introduction of safepoints (Araujo et al., 2008).  
Nienaltowsky and Meyer (Nienaltowski and Meyer, 2006) present an interesting 
approach regarding the use of contracts in a concurrent environment. They target SCOOP 
(Arslan et al., 2006), an extension of the Eiffel language to provide support for 
concurrency. They do not consider specification inheritance nor conduct any experiment. 
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Greenhouse et al. (Greenhouse et al., 2005) describe a series of annotations related to the 
specification of the concurrent behaviour of a Java program. Their annotations are similar 
to those of (Rodríguez et al., 2005b) with respect to locking properties and member 
ownership, and thus suffer from the same limitations. They do not present a construct to 
state the thread-safety of an object. Their work focuses on the static checking of such 
properties with an emphasis on the evolution and refactoring of concurrent programs. 
They do not present a solution to the verification of functional properties in combination 
with concurrency properties. 
Qadeer and Wu (Qadeer and Wu, 2004) translate a concurrent program into a sequential 
program, which is, then, analyzed by a checker to detect data races. Their approach has 
been applied to multithreaded C programs; ours focuses on object-oriented programs. 
Their approach may miss some faults but it never reports false positives, exactly as ours. 
They focus on data races only, whilst our approach covers deadlocks as well. Their 
approach suffers from one limitation: it does not allow a developer to specify under 
which conditions objects are expected to be thread-safe, which leads to false positives 
since environmental assumptions cannot be taken into account by the checker.  
VYRD (Elmas et al., 2005) is a tool to detect data races based on a trace refinement 
technique. A concurrent execution must be a refinement of a trace specification. 
FastTrack (Flanagan and Freund, 2010) is a precise (i.e., no false positive) dynamic race 
detection algorithm based on Lamport’s happens-before memory access relation. 
ToleRace (Ratanaworabhan et al., 2009) is a system to detect and tolerate data races. The 
detection mechanism is similar to ours (Araujo et al., 2011a), although they also 
implement techniques to tolerate races or report them otherwise. Differently than our 
approach, their tool does not require annotations. None of these approaches address the 
verification of functional properties. They also do not consider inheritance. 
In (Le Traon et al., 2006) the authors describe how to use contracts to generate assertion 
code. The authors propose metrics to evaluate the benefits of instrumenting contracts. 
They define vigilance and diagnosability and apply them to several case studies. The 
experiments are, however, limited to small programs in which faults are introduced via 
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program mutation (Baudry et al., 2000b). Briand et al. (Briand et al., 2003) clarify the 
concept and metric of observability (as a replacement for vigilance) and diagnosability. 
Although carefully designed, their experiment is performed on a small system through 
mutation analysis. Both studies are restricted to sequential software.  
To summarize, except for our previous work (Araujo et al., 2008), (Araujo et al., 2011a) 
and (Araujo et al., 2011b), no existing work reports on a unified solution to the 
specification and dynamic verification of concurrent and functional properties. 
Furthermore, no empirical study rigorously assesses the effectiveness of contracts as test 
oracles in terms of fault detection and diagnosis based on a highly concurrent industrial 
system. This is the main contribution of this paper leveraging on our previous work. By 
doing so, we believe to present a viable solution to the problem of applying DbC to 
concurrent software and we provide credible empirical evidence of its cost-effectiveness. 
3 CONCURRENT CONTRACTS 
This section presents the problems and solutions of using contracts to specify behaviour 
and generating runtime assertion checking code for concurrent programs. It starts with a 
summary of JML, followed by a description of the problem of interference together with 
our solution. We only present an overview of our solution here and refer the interested 
reader to our previous publications for a complete argumentation: extensions to JML 
(Araujo et al., 2008), extensions to the JML compiler (Araujo et al., 2011a). 
3.1 The Java Modeling Language 
JML has a Java-like syntax and specifications, written in javadoc style, and can even 
perform method calls. In JML, the interface of a method is specified through a set of 
clauses. The most relevant clauses for this study are: 
• requires: specifies a precondition. 
• ensures: specifies a postcondition. 
• when: specifies a wait condition. 
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• signals: specifies a predicate to hold if a given exception is thrown (i.e., the 
exceptional postcondition). 
• signals_only: constrains the exceptions that can be thrown when a condition 
for exceptional behaviour is satisfied. 
• normal_behaviour: specifies the conditions in which a method returns 
normally and what it ensures. 
• exceptional_behaviour: specifies the conditions in which a method throws 
an exception and what it ensures. 
A method specification is composed of specification cases separated by the keyword 
also (each with a precondition and the corresponding expected postcondition, the 
postcondition to be established if the precondition is satisfied). In JML, the preconditions 
of a method, as well as arguments to the \old operator are evaluated in the method’s 
pre-state. The method postconditions are evaluated in the method’s post-state. “The pre-
state of a method call is the state just after the method is called and parameters have been 
evaluated and passed, but before execution of the method’s body. The post-state of a 
method call is the state just before the method returns or throws an exception; in JML we 
imagine that \result and information about exception results is recorded in the post-
state” ((Leavens et al., 2006), p. 8). 
Invariants are specified using the invariant clause. Invariants must hold in any 
publicly visible state, i.e., prior to and after the execution of any instance method and 
constructor, with the exception of private methods marked with the helper modifier. 
These are methods used to establish intermediate states.  
JML provides a rich set of native operators for defining complex specifications, the most 
relevant for this study being: 
• \old(e): used in post-conditions to refer to the value of expression e in the pre-
state of the method.  
• \return: the return value of a method.  
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• Operators < and <= are used to test the order of lock acquisition. A lock is greater 
than another if it was acquired later. 
Figure 1 shows an example of a contract. It tells that the head of the list will move to the 
next element and the method will return the value of what used to be the first element of 
the list if the list is not empty (lines 5-9), and returns null otherwise (lines 1-4).  
JML allows the use of model fields in specifications by using the modifier model in a 
declaration. Model fields are accessible only to specification code and are treated as 
regular Java fields. They are useful to support abstract specifications. Model fields can be 
specified on interfaces, something Java does not allow. Being specified on interfaces and 
classes, they are also inherited. Model fields are realized by concrete classes through the 
represents clause, which maps (in)directly model fields to a set of Java fields. Similar 
to model fields, ghost fields are also specification only, can be declared on interfaces and 
classes. However, ghost fields are explicitly assigned values within a method’s body 
instead of using the represents clause. 
A method is pure if it is declared with the modifier pure or is a member of a pure class 
or interface. Pure methods must terminate and are not allowed to have side-effects (i.e., 
they cannot assign to fields that exist in the pre-state). Pure constructors must terminate 
and can only assign to the object being constructed. Only pure methods are allowed in 
assertions (e.g., in the requires and ensures clauses of a method specification). 
3.2 Contracts and Concurrency 
In a previous paper (Araujo et al., 2008), we addressed the problem of interference by 
combining the use of safepoints (a language construct we introduced to demarcate the 
safe places to evaluate contracts) with thread-safety requirements (language constructs 
we introduced to describe predicates specifying conditions for accessing shared objects), 
as defined and illustrated below (Figure 1). Although straightforward, this specification is 
not correct in a multi-threaded environment without safepoints. Suppose that extract() 
is invoked by thread 1 and in the method’s pre-state, head references the same object as 
last (i.e., the list is empty). Suppose, also, that thread 2 pre-empts thread 1 right after 
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thread 1 acquires the lock on this LinkedQueue instance to fully execute method 
insert(), which does not acquire such a lock for performance reasons. The 
postcondition of insert() specifies that head is not referencing the same object as 
last, i.e., the list is not empty. Once thread 1 resumes execution and acquires the lock 
on head, it will return the first element of the list, violating the postcondition of 
extract() for an (expected) empty list, i.e., that it should have returned null.  
 
Figure 1: Method extract() of class LinkedQueue using safepoints to avoid 
internal interference. 
This is an example of interference in the context of DbC. This problem is not specific to 
Java or JML. Any object-oriented language in which the scenario we described above is 
realizable and provides support for DbC via runtime assertion checking (RAC) is prone 
to this problem. It is important to emphasize that such problem is not due to erroneous 
concurrency control on the part of the implementation either of the client or the provider. 
Interference can also happen between the contract evaluation point (pre- and post-state) 
and the method entry and exit points. Since interleaving occurs outside the method body, 
public class LinkedQueue { 
    protected /*@ spec_public @*/ LinkedNode head; 
    protected /*@ spec_public @*/ LinkedNode last; 
    //@ public invariant head.value == null; 
1   /*@ public normal_behavior 
2     @  requires head == last; 
3     @  assignable \nothing; 
4     @  ensures \result == null; 
5     @ also public normal_behavior 
6     @  requires head != last; 
7     @  assignable head, head.next.value; 
8     @  ensures head == \old(head.next) &&  
9     @   \result == \old(head.next.value); 
10    @*/  
11    public synchronized  Object extract() { 
12        synchronized (head) { 
13            //@requires_safepoint: 
14            Object x = null; 
15            LinkedNode first = head.next; 
16            if (first != null) { 
17                x = first.value; 
18                first.value = null; 
19                head = first; 
20            } 
21            //@ensures_safepoint: 
22            return x; 
23        } 
24    } 
25} 
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this is called external interference. The previous case, where interleaving occurs inside 
the method body is called internal interference. 
A safepoint is any point inside the method body where it is safe to evaluate contract 
assertions. A precondition safepoint is a point where it is safe to evaluate preconditions 
and invariants, and the pre-state predicates of postconditions. A postcondition safepoint is 
a point where it is safe to evaluate the expected postconditions and the invariants. Any 
method execution path (from the pre-state to the post-state) can have only one 
precondition safepoint and only one postcondition safepoint. If no precondition (resp. 
postcondition) safepoint is explicitly specified for an execution path, it defaults to the 
method pre-state (resp. post-state). This ensures the semantics of evaluating preconditions 
once at the beginning of the method and postconditions once at the end of the method is 
maintained for concurrent programs. The requires_safepoint and 
ensures_safepoint labels demarcate those safepoints. At the precondition safepoint 
in Figure 1 (line 13), all the objects referenced by both requires clauses (lines 2 and 6) 
and the contents of the \old statements in the ensures clauses (lines 8-9) are properly 
protected by locks. At the postcondition safepoint (line 21), the field head, present in the 
ensures clause at lines 8-9, is properly protected by a lock. Since \result refers to 
local variable x, which in turn points to an object no longer referenced by the list, it is 
also thread-safe at the postcondition safepoint. Finally, the object invariant can be safely 
evaluated both in the pre- and postcondition safepoints since it refers to head, which is 
properly locked in both places. The postcondition safepoint must be the return or throw 
statement. Additionally, the return (or throw) expression must be side-effect free. In case 
the method does not return a value, the ensures_safepoint label can be placed at the 
end of a block or just before the method returns. 
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Figure 2: Method declaration exemplifying the use of thread-safety specification 
clauses. 
We also solved (Araujo et al., 2008) the issue of thread-safety specification by detaching 
these properties from preconditions while considering interference and inheritance issues. 
Thread-safety properties are specified using the requires_thread_safe and 
ensures_thread_safe clauses of a method specification. Such clauses specify a list 
of objects to which access is required to be thread-safe. An object is considered to be 
thread-safe if it is local to the current thread (i.e., no other thread has a reference to it) or 
access to it is protected by a lock. Thread-safety properties can also be specified by 
referring explicitly to the locks the current thread must or must not hold before or after a 
method execution. Figure 2 shows such an example (lines 8-10) in combination with 
safepoints. The requires_thread_safe clause specifies that object r must be thread-
safe in the method pre-state. This is necessary because the effective precondition, 
accounting for normal and exceptional behavior of the method is r.isRequest() (the 
disjunction of preconditions from both specification cases simplifies to (connected or 
!connected) && r.isRequest()). In this situation, safepoints alone cannot 
guarantee the thread-safe observation of this predicate since r is external to the provider. 
Once such object is thread-safe, predicates involving it can be checked at precondition 
safepoints since they will not change between the method pre-state and the safepoints. A 
/*@  
1   normal_behaviour 
2    requires connected && r.isRequest(); 
3    ensures \result.isResponse(); 
4   also 
5   exceptional_behaviour 
6     requires !connected && r.isRequest(); 
7     signals_only NotConnectedException; 
8   concurrent_behaviour 
9     requires_thread_safe r; 
10    ensures_thread_safe \result; 
   */ 
public Message sendAndWait(Message r) throws … { 
11   synchronized(in) { 
12       synchronized(this) { 
13           //@ requires_safepoint: 
14           if(closed || remoteClosed) 
15               throw new NotConnectedException(); 
16       }          
17       out.put(r);              
18       return in.get(); 
19   } 
} 
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similar discussion can be made for postconditions and thus the 
ensures_thread_safe clause specifies that the object returned by the method must 
be thread-safe on the method’s post-state. The *_thread_safe clauses guarantee 
freedom from interference with respect to r from the method pre-state up to the 
precondition safepoint and with respect to \result on the post-state. Precondition 
safepoints prevent interference related to field connected. As these are the only 
possible sources of interference, we conclude that combining safepoints and thread-safety 
predicates guarantees sendAndWait() and its contract are interference-free. In general, 
the combination of thread-safety requirements on data to be observed by the provider and 
the client with safepoints (for safe evaluation of predicates referring to internal state) is 
required to guarantee freedom from interference. A complete argument is presented in 
(Araujo, 2010; Araujo et al., 2008). 
4 RUNTIME ASSERTION CHECKING, INTERFERENCE 
FREEDOM AND TEST VALIDITY 
As seen in section 3.2, freedom from interference is required to ensure that the functional 
facets of contracts are evaluated correctly. Establishing freedom from interference, 
therefore, depends on the correct placement of safepoints within a method body (the 
determinant of internal interference), and on the correct and complete specification of the 
concurrent facet of each contract (the determinant of external interference). The correct 
placement of safepoints is dealt with in section 5, as part of the case study execution. This 
section deals only with the external interference component.  
Another significant issue is the practical use of RAC with industrial systems. The correct 
and complete specification of the concurrent facet of contracts is not sufficient to ensure 
that a system instrumented with RAC code can be used as a valid replacement of the 
original system during system testing activities. Equivalence between the instrumented 
system and its original version is required. This equivalence must enable the conclusion 
that the absence of failures in the instrumented system when subject to a test suite implies 
the absence of failures in the original system when subject to the same test suite. This 
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equivalence must also enable the conclusion that the occurrence of a failure in the 
original system implies the occurrence of a failure in the instrumented system. However, 
the manifestation of such failure is expected to be different in the two systems: the 
instrumented system is expected to raise an assertion error due to a contract violation. 
We investigated the equivalence between the instrumented and the original version of a 
system (Araujo et al., 2011a). The equivalence is determined based on the observable 
behaviour of the system (a factor named indistinguishability) and on the use of resources 
(a factor named runtime overhead). These two factors were considered independently. 
The system used for the execution of such experiment is the one used for this paper’s 
case study and is described in section 5.2. The runtime overhead was analyzed with 
respect to the consumption of three resources: CPU, memory and persistent storage. 
Though the impact of instrumentation is, as expected, significant, the load on the system 
can be adjusted to guarantee resource usage conditions by the instrumented version 
similar to those of the production version. As a result, instrumented applications can be 
executed in the same environment as the one used by the original version. 
Indistinguishability was analyzed based on the behaviour of the instrumented and the 
original versions of the system in the presence and absence of faults. Furthermore, a 
systematic analysis of the instrumentation process concluded that no thread interleavings 
present in the original version of the system are prevented from occurring in the 
instrumented version. The two versions were thus deemed indistinguishable. Combined 
with the runtime overhead result above, the instrumented system is deemed equivalent to 
the original one for system testing purposes.  
The equivalence result guarantees that concurrent faults manifest themselves equally in 
both versions of the system. It is then possible to study the completeness and correctness 
of the concurrent facet of contracts. Contracts are defined by humans and, therefore, can 
be incorrect and incomplete. An incorrect contract, for the purposes of this discussion, is 
one that specifies more restrictive conditions for the establishment of thread-safety than 
necessary for the establishment of freedom from interference. In this case, the contracts 
will raise assertion violations for correct executions (i.e., false positives). This is not a 
serious problem, although counter-productive, since developers can identify those cases 
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and adjust the contracts accordingly. An incomplete contract, however, has the potential 
of allowing the execution of functional contracts in a non-thread-safe environment, 
therefore threatening the validity of any results obtained during testing with the 
instrumented system. Incompleteness can be caused either by an oversight from the 
contract developer or by an intrinsic limitation of the RAC and the specification language 
it uses.  
In (Araujo et al., 2011b), we determined experimentally (through fault injection) that the 
contracts can detect all concurrent faults (race conditions and deadlocks), and thus any 
completeness issue would be simply a case of design oversight. We also determined that 
the concurrent facet of contracts could be considered largely complete to begin with and 
could then be updated in later iterations to detect the remaining concurrent faults. We can 
therefore state that the execution of the functional facet of contracts in a concurrent 
system, which also contains contracts with a concurrent facet, can be largely guaranteed 
to be free from external interference.  
Combined with the equivalence result regarding the instrumented version of the system, 
freedom from external interference guarantees the interpretability of the results we 
provide in section 6 regarding our case study described in the next section. 
5 CASE STUDY 
Up to this point, providing an overview of results reported elsewhere, we have shown that 
DbC can be applied to concurrent programs by defining specialized specification 
constructs (section 3.2) and by showing that the results of executing tests on an 
instrumented program can be considered equivalent to those on the original version of 
such program and free from external interference (section 4). The missing step and main 
contribution of this paper is to investigate whether contracts, when applied to concurrent 
software using our JML extensions, can effectively be used to detect and diagnose 
functional faults. 
As shown in (Briand et al., 2003), the content of the contracts has a significant influence 
on their ability to detect and diagnose faults in sequential programs. Following a similar 
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approach, in the context of concurrent software, we answer the following research 
questions which are part of the overall objective stated above: (Q1) Are there limitations 
regarding the type of faults contracts can detect in a program? (Q2) What is the relation 
(if one exists) between the effort spent in designing contracts (i.e., their level of detail) 
and their ability to detect and diagnose faults? (Q3) Is the complexity of the methods 
being specified a factor in such relation? (Q4) Are there faults that cannot be detected by 
contracts irrespective of their level of detail? (Q5) Based on such relations and the 
categories of undetectable faults, what recommendations can be offered to practitioners to 
balance the effort in contract design with the yield in terms of fault detection and 
diagnosis efficiency? 
We go about answering these questions by defining precise measures for observability 
and diagnosability, the quantities that reflect how well faults can be detected and 
diagnosed, respectively, as in (Briand et al., 2003). We then categorize contracts based on 
the features of the specification language they use (e.g., the use of quantifiers). These 
categories determine the effort to design a contract. We also define a fine grained 
measure of contract complexity independent of the above categories, which can be used 
as a surrogate measure to assess the effort in designing a contract. Using these measures 
we execute an experiment consisting of injecting real faults in an industrial system and 
measuring the observability and diagnosability of such faults. This is achieved by 
instrumenting the system with contracts of different types while recording relevant data 
on contract and method complexity. Differently from the work of Briand et al. (Briand et 
al., 2003), we inject faults that were once present in the system instead of using program 
mutation. By applying objective and focused fault selection criteria, we enable the 
investigation of the above research questions with a focus on system testing and in a 
highly realistic setting. Another obvious difference is the focus on concurrent programs. 
This section begins by reviewing the concepts of observability and diagnosability 
(section 5.1). It follows with a description of the test bed used to conduct this study 
(section 5.2). The experimental methodology is described in sections 5.3 (measure 
definitions) and 5.4 (experimental procedure). Section 6 reports on the results of our 
experiments. 
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5.1 Background on Observability and Diagnosability 
This section is an introduction to the concepts and measures of observability and 
diagnosability, which will be used in our industrial case study. For a complete exposition, 
see (Briand et al., 2003; Le Traon et al., 2006). 
The observability of a system (also called global observability) composed of a set of 
interconnected components is defined as the probability that a fault internal to a 
component is detected in the component itself (e.g., through assertion violations) or in 
any one of the other components.  
Diagnosability is defined as the ease with which the causes of a failure can be isolated. It 
can be measured based on an estimate of the effort required to diagnose by measuring the 
distance between the location of the failure detection and the location of the faulty 
statements that caused it. Such distance can be defined as the number of methods 
investigated beginning at the detection point (where the failure occurred) to the location 
of the faulty statement according to a diagnosis flow. Our proposed distance definition is 
adapted from (Briand et al., 2003) to make it more precise by resolving ambiguities 
(flagged below) and is a contribution of the current paper. This, like any model, is a 
simplification of reality since expert developers frequently use shortcuts to diagnose a 
failure. Such simplification, however, is necessary to perform a rigorous, large-scale 
study of diagnosability. 
The starting point of the diagnosis is the method in which the failure was detected: either 
the caller of the method with the violated method precondition or the method with an 
internal assertion or a post-condition violation. We do not use internal assertions since 
contracts are completely defined in terms of pre-conditions, post-conditions and 
invariants, both in the functional and the concurrent facets. The search proceeds then 
from the beginning of the method in which the failure was detected, recursively exploring 
all the methods called until the fault is uncovered or the end of the method is reached. In 
the latter case, the search proceeds to the caller method. We assume a method is 
investigated only once. The method to be investigated is determined according to the 
dynamic type of the target object, not its static type (ambiguity 1). A method call is not 
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explored if it is certain, based on method arguments and syntactical constraints, that the 
particular execution path leading to the fault did not execute it (ambiguity 2). For 
instance, a method called in an else block of an if-then-else statement is not investigated 
if we ascertain that the then block was executed. The behaviour described by ambiguity 1 
above is implied but it needed to be explicitly described. The behaviour covered by 
ambiguity 2 is a fundamental addition to the diagnosis flow to reflect the behaviour of a 
developer exploring multiple execution branches: when sure, a developer only 
investigates one branch, but when in doubt, alternate branches are investigated. This 
additional effort must be accounted for. 
To illustrate this process, consider an execution depicted by the UML sequence diagram 
of Figure 3. Assuming an assertion violation occurs when evaluating the precondition of 
method e(), the diagnosis flow is then the sequence [a, b, c] (method d() is not 
inspected since the faulty statement is discovered in a statement preceding its invocation). 
The distance is then 3. An assertion violation occurring in the post-condition of method 









Assertion violation  and 
detection in operation e()
 
Figure 3: Diagnosability measure example: diagnosis flow as a sequence diagram. 
An alternate measure of diagnosability is the number of statements located between the 
contract immediately preceding the faulty statement and the contract detecting the failure 
for a particular execution: the diagnosis scope (Le Traon et al., 2006). This comprises all 
statements suspected of containing the fault from the failure observation point (i.e., the 
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assertion violation) to the satisfied contract immediately preceding the faulty statement 
according to the specific execution that uncovered the failure. A good estimate of the 
diagnosis scope is the number of method lines of code (MLOC) for all methods included 
in the diagnosis scope. MLOC counts the number of non-blank and non-comment lines of 
code inside method bodies. 
Both measures may not reflect accurately the effort a developer spends in diagnosing a 
failure. They do not precisely take into account the complexity of the methods being 
investigated (e.g., complexity in terms of control flow). McCabe’s Cyclomatic 
Complexity (VG) ((McCabe, 1976) is a well known measure of method complexity. It 
basically indicates the number of execution paths a developer needs to mentally traverse 
to completely understand a method. Other metrics combine control flow complexity and 
computational complexity (Weyuker, 1988). With the exception of computationally 
intensive software (e.g., numeric processing), which is not the target of this study, VG is 
a simple measure expected to correlate with the effort in determining if a fault is located 
inside a particular method body or not.  
We define the weighed distance measure as the number of execution paths to investigate, 
from the detection point (where the failure occurred) to the location of the faulty 
statement according to a diagnosis flow. The diagnosis flow is identical to the one used 
for the distance measure of (Briand et al., 2003). The weighed distance is then the sum of 
the VG values of the methods of a diagnosis flow. For instance, assuming methods a(), 
b(), c(), d(), e() and f() in Figure 3 have VG values of 2, 5, 3, 4, 2 and 5, 
respectively, the weighed distance for diagnosis flow [a, b, c] is 10 and 17 for [e, f, a, b, 
c].  
All above measures are expected to correlate (see section 6.1.3) and differ only in terms 
of granularity. These are surrogate measures of the diagnosis effort, the effort to diagnose 
a fault, which is affected by the programmer’s skills. More investigation is required to 
determine which one is a better fit for determining diagnosis effort in terms of man-hours 
for example. To enable their comparison, we adopt the definition of global diagnosability 
(Le Traon et al., 2006): Δ = 1− !!, where Δ is the global diagnosibility, δ is the absolute 
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measure of diagnosis effort (distance, weighed distance, diagnosis scope), and θ is the 
maximum value of the diagnosis effort for an execution thread T. The value of θ can then 
be measured using the total number of statements (or methods, or sum of methods’ VGs) 
traversed on an execution thread as measured by diagnosis scope (or distance or weighed 
distance). The global diagnosability then varies between 0, for the case one must traverse 
the whole execution thread to diagnose a fault (i.e., no contract detects a fault), and 1, for 
the (asymptotic) case the faulty statement coincides with the one generating the assertion 
error. 
5.2 Target System and Test Bed Setup 
The target system is the Service Activation Engine (SAE) component of the Session 
Resource Controller product line of Juniper Networks. It is a platform to design and 
deploy value-added services in an Internet Protocol network. It does so by converting 
service definitions specified as an abstract set of traffic controlling policies for a 
particular subscriber into device specific policies in the context of the interface such 
subscriber uses to connect to the network. The SAE currently supports various devices. 
Our empirical study focuses on a subsystem, called the router driver, which interfaces 
with Juniper’s E-series routers. It is responsible for responding to asynchronous 
notifications from the router regarding the state of each subscriber interface and 
managing traffic policies for each such interface. Due to the large number of subscribers 
a router supports, these requests are processed concurrently to maximize system 
performance. The router driver is responsible for the translation task above, the low-level 
communication with the router, and to ensure correctness in the presence of concurrent 
processing. It does so by implementing a transactional infrastructure to guarantee ACID 
(Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and Durability) properties of transactions. The SAE is 
capable of managing approximately 520,000 active subscribers connected to multiple E-
series routers. This amounts to executing approximately 1,500 transactions per second. 
The complex functionality of the router driver subsystem allows the use of complex 
functional specification constructs, and its high degree of concurrency with varied and 
intricate concurrency control patterns allows us to explore all proposed constructs in 
section 3.2. With respect to code size, the router driver subsystem is composed of 54 
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classes and interfaces (33,509 LOC), all of which are used in a concurrent environment. 
Of these, 34 present concurrent behaviour. In many ways this can be considered a 
representative concurrent system in the telecom domain. 
We use an actual test suite composed of a large number of test cases that are required to 
pass for a version of the SAE component to be released to production. Each test case 
exercises the SAE through its interfaces and the test case oracle (embedded in the test 
case) checks return values, parameters and exceptions of operations against expected 
values. It also checks the presence or absence of expected contents in the log files 
produced by the SAE, such as error messages related to the operation performed. 
The test suite was built using a black box approach based on test plans derived from 
functional specification documents of SAE’s features. Specific size and coverage 
parameters of the test suite are confidential information of Juniper Networks. However, 
the key property for this study can be stated: there is at least one test case in the test suite 
that exercises each fault of the fault database in such a way that the fault manifests itself 
as a failure in the production system or as an assertion violation in the instrumented 
system if the fault is observable by contracts. The test suite is executed in an environment 
that mimics production environments. 
The scripts composing the standard test suite take as input several parameters that impact 
the load imposed on the overall system. Some of these parameters are the rate at which 
subscribers log in(out) to(of) the network, the total number of subscribers and types of 
services such subscribers have. All these parameters are abstracted as a load factor due to 
their confidential nature. The only property of interest concerning the load factor is its 
ratio between program executions, i.e., if the load factor in one execution is double the 
value of another’s then the overall load the first execution imposes on the system is 
double the other’s. The load factor represents mainly the throughput of the system. 
5.3 Categories and Complexity of Contracts 
To assess the effect of contract content on the observability and diagnosability of the 
system with respect to functional faults, the content of the contracts is restricted 
according to different rules that define a contract type. To clearly relate the effort in 
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designing contracts and their ability to detect and diagnose faults, a measure of contract 
complexity is defined as a surrogate measure of effort. 
5.3.1 Contract Specification Types 
Briand et al. (Briand et al., 2002; Briand et al., 2003) define three levels of precision of a 
contract for their experiment: at the highest precision, every distinct condition possibly 
resulting from a different set of inputs or system state is distinguished in the post 
condition; the intermediate precision only distinguishes conditions for the standard 
situation (expected execution) from exceptional situations that are also addressed by the 
method; the lowest precision just defines the ranges/enumerations of values expected as 
resulting from executing the method. These levels suit their work well since they consider 
only analysis contracts. The contracts to be developed for the router driver are at the 
design level, and normally include some information regarding the exceptional behaviour 
of a method, especially in Java since exceptions normally have to be declared in the 
method signature. Therefore, the intermediate precision level is not useful.  
The four contract types we defined and used in our study are described below in 
ascending order of sophistication (see Table 1 for a summary) and exemplified next. We 
decided for a categorization based on the structure of the contract (the language features 
used) instead of precision of specification (behaviour specified) since the latter cannot be 
automatically checked. It is expected that contracts of higher sophistication require more 
effort to design since they enable the more detailed specification of method behaviour. 
The types are: 
• Basic: defines ranges and enumerations for native types in pre/postconditions and 
invariants, checks for null-ness of references and simple properties of such 
objects. A simple property only involves pure (side effect free) methods (e.g., 
isEmpty() of the Java collection classes). No model fields are allowed in any 
specification. Expressions using quantifiers are also not used. 
• Elementary: basic plus the use of model fields, model methods, and ghost fields. 
Interfaces also make use of model instance fields to specify some behaviour. 
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Model methods serve as convenience methods in this case to factor out 
computations that could otherwise be stated directly in the contract. They improve 
the contract’s readability. 
• Intermediate: elementary plus quantification over elements of collections given as 
arguments, data members, and return values, plus the use of pre-defined modeling 
types. The predicate of such quantified expressions should only refer to basic 
properties of such elements specified through the use of their pure methods or 
ranges of values if native types.  
• Advanced: no language restrictions. The use of specification-only pure classes 
(model programs (Leavens et al., 2009) are not supported by the RAC (Cheon and 
Leavens, 2003)) designed to simulate the correct behaviour of a class or cluster of 
classes is allowed as well as non-trivial model methods. For our purpose, a model 
method is considered non-trivial if the contract specifying its behaviour is 
required to be of type advanced to allow for complete behaviour specification (i.e. 
it is not just a convenience method). 
Table 1: JML features allowed in contracts as a function of their type. 
 Ranges, enumerations, 









Basic ●    
Elementary ● ●   
Intermediate ● ● ●  
Advanced ● ● ● ● 
The use of thread-safety related constructs is not subject to the above rules since they are 
necessary for the safe evaluation of the functional contracts regardless of their type.  
The Basic type’s purpose is to enable creating contracts that state properties using only 
the existing code; the designer does not put effort in introducing new code (e.g., model 
fields and methods) or creating constructs to loop over objects (e.g., quantifiers). 
Therefore, Basic contracts are generally simple to design. Elementary contracts introduce 
the use of model fields. Although declaring a model field is quite simple, a subclass will 
require a represents clause to map the abstract model field to a concrete 
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implementation, which can be quite a complex task depending on the nature of the class. 
This is the reason why the use of model fields is tracked as part of a separate, more 
sophisticated type of contract than Basic. Intermediate contracts introduce the use of 
quantifiers. The rationale for having the use of quantifiers (both existential and universal) 
tracked in a separate contract type is the added effort required when specifying the 
expression itself, the predicate to be checked and enforcing the thread safety of all objects 
in the quantifier’s domain. Furthermore, it is quite common to use pre-defined modelling 
types to conform to the purity requirements of specifications (section 3.1). The use of 
such classes is also an added effort to contract design. Advanced contracts introduce the 
use of pure classes and non-trivial model methods, which have to be created solely for the 
purpose of type and method specification. These are used to simulate the visible 
behaviour of methods and, therefore, need to be pure (i.e. side-effect free) to be used 
within contracts. The added effort put in the design of such classes and methods is 
significant, which justifies tracking their use in a separate contract type.  
We use method open() of interface Central (Figure 4) to illustrate the differences 
between the types of contracts (shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6). The basic contract for 
method open() refers only to parameters and exceptions. No postcondition is specified 
because the return value is an interface that uses model fields (not shown) and model 
fields are not allowed in basic contracts. Although exception 
ConnectionAllocatedException is not part of the method signature, it still appears 
in the contract since this exception is a child of RuntimeException and 
RuntimeException is not mandatory in method signatures. The elementary contract 
incorporates the use of model field peers. Also notice that the elementary contract is 
more detailed than the basic one since it can refer to model fields in the return value as 
well as instance fields on the interface. By adding an invariant that uses the universal 
quantifier to specify a property for each element of the peers collection, the contract 
becomes of the intermediate type. The advanced type of contract uses the Connection 
class (not shown) in its specification (the ghost field connections is a collection of all 
established connections). It is a specification-only pure class designed just to represent 
the connection between two peers. It is not actually used in the method’s implementation. 
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Notice that the complete behaviour of the method can be specified, i.e. the contract 
simulates all possible conditions both normal and exceptional and describes the post-state 
as a function of the pre-state to the maximum level of detail that a client of the method 
could expect. In this example, this means the precise conditions in which a connection is 
created and recorded as well as the conditions in which it fails to create a connection and 
the particular exceptions thrown for each condition.  
 
 





 // Contract of Central.open() behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId); 
  signals_only ConnectionRefusedException, ConnectionAllocatedException, 
               UnknownPeerException; 
/** 
 * The central establishes a connection between peers.  
 * Peers are identified by unique names. 
 * There are two ways to establish a connection: callback or rendezvous. 
 * In the callback mode, a peer registers to receive a notification when  
 * a connection is attempted. In the rendezvous mode both peers attempt  
 * to open a channel and wait until both participants are present.   
 */ 
public interface Central {     
    /** 
     * Opens a channel to the remote peer. The remote peer must be  
     * registered to receive connection notifications. 
     *  
     * @param aRemoteId the ID of the remote peer 
     * @param aLocalId the ID of the local peer 
     * @return the channel to be used to communicate with the remote peer 
     * @throws UnknownPeerException if the central does not have a remote 
     * peer registered with the given ID  
     * @throws ConnectionRefusedException if the remote peer refused to  
     * establish a connection 
     * @throws ConnectionAllocatedException if a connection already  
     * exists between the two peers 
     */     
    public Channel open(String aRemoteId, String aLocalId)  
        throws UnknownPeerException, ConnectionRefusedException; 
} 









// Added specification to the interface 
public instance model HashSet peers; 
 
// Contract of Central.open() 
behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && peers.contains(aRemoteId); 
  ensures  !peers.contains(aRemoteId) && \result.connected; 
  signals_only ConnectionRefusedException, ConnectionAllocatedException; 
also 
  exceptional_behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && !peers.contains(aRemoteId); 








// Added specification to the interface 
public instance model HashSet peers; 
public invariant (\forall p; peers.contains(p); p.length() < 50); 
 
// Contract of Central.open() 
behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && peers.contains(aRemoteId); 
  ensures  !peers.contains(aRemoteId) && \result.connected; 
  signals_only ConnectionRefusedException, ConnectionAllocatedException; 
also 
  exceptional_behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && !peers.contains(aRemoteId); 
  signals_only UnknownPeerException; 
Figure 5: Basic, Elementary and Intermediate contracts for Central.open(). 
  
Figure 6: Advanced contract for Central.open() 
It is clear (by construction) that contracts of a higher sophistication type can specify all 
behaviours specified in one of a lower type. This implies that a fault detected by a 
contract of a lower sophistication is also detected by a contract of higher sophistication 
// Added specification to the interface 
public instance model HashSet peers; 
public invariant (\forall p; peers.contains(p); p.length() < 50); 
public instance ghost HashSet connections = new HashSet(); 
public invariant (\forall Connection c; connections.contains(c); 
                  !peers.contains(c.peer1) && !peers.contains(c.peer2)); 
 
// Contract of Central.open()  
behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && peers.contains(aRemoteId) &&  
           !connections.contains(new Connection(aRemoteId, aLocalId)); 
  ensures \result.connection.equals(new Connection(aRemoteId, aLocalId)) 
          && !peers.contains(aRemoteId) && \result.connected &&  
          connections.contains(new Connection(aRemoteId, aLocalId)); 
  signals_only ConnectionRefusedException; 
also 
  exceptional_behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && 
           connections.contains(new Connection(aRemoteId, aLocalId)); 
  signals_only ConnectionAllocatedException; 
also 
  exceptional_behaviour 
  requires !aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && !peers.contains(aRemoteId); 
  signals_only UnknownPeerException;      
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for the same method and type. It is also clear by looking at the preceding example that a 
more sophisticated contract requires more effort to write due to the extra level of detail 
needed to use the more sophisticated features of the language as well as the ability to 
distinguish more cases through the use of such features. 
Having four different contract types implies that it is necessary to have four different 
versions of the system, each with contracts of one particular type, when running our 
experiments. If it is not possible for a method to have a contract of a particular type (e.g., 
because its behaviour can be completely specified by a contract of a lower sophistication 
type), a contract of a lower sophistication type is used instead.  
5.3.2 A Measure of Contract Complexity 
Although useful, the contract type alone is not necessarily a complete indication of the 
complexity of a contract and, therefore, the effort involved in designing it. For instance, a 
basic contract can contain a large number of terms referring to multiple fields and method 
parameters while an intermediate contract can contain a single quantified expression. It is 
clear that, in such a case, the effort necessary to design the basic contract is greater than 
the effort to design the intermediate contract. A measure of contract complexity is, thus, 
needed to complement the notion of contract type. 
This measure depends on the structure of a contract which must be clearly defined. For 
the purposes of this measure, a contract is a set of clauses (e.g. a requires statement) 
and specification cases. A specification case relates clauses within a contract. A type is a 
set of contracts and invariants. Clauses are Boolean expressions that can contain the usual 
elements as well as quantifiers. A contract belongs to a type: class or interface. This is 
necessary to represent the inheritance of specifications in a type hierarchy.   
We define a measure of contract complexity (!"#$%&'()*(!)) according to a property-
based approach for measurement definition (Briand et al., 1996). The notation is as 
follows: uppercase M denotes a contract, T denotes a class or an interface (i.e., a type), c 
denotes a clause and sc denotes a specification case (section 3.1); ∙ ! denotes the number 
of constructs “x” of its argument (e.g., ! ∨ denotes the number of disjuncts of clause c); 
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!! denotes a contract for type !; ≤ denotes the subtype relation between two classes 
and/or interfaces: the left operand is a subtype of the right operand. Subscripts are used to 
differentiate methods, types, clauses or specification cases. We assert, based on intuitive 
arguments presented next, that a contract complexity measure needs to present the 
following properties: 
1. Since a contract is composed of clauses (e.g., preconditions, postconditions, 
invariants), and each clause can be arbitrarily complex, we have ! ∈ ! ⇒!"#$%&'()*(!) ≥ !"#$%&'()*(!) and !! ⊇ !! ⇒ !"#$%&'()*(!!) ≥!"#$%&'()*(!!). 
2. Logically equivalent clauses in different specification cases are considered to 
be designed independently. They only relate to each other via a specification 
case (section 3.1). Grouping clauses into specification cases increases the 
design effort as one needs to correlate two or more predicates: a precondition 
and the predicates to be satisfied as a consequence of the precondition, i.e., the 
postcondition. In other words, all things being equal, a contract with more 
specification cases is more complex. !! !" ≥ !! !" ∧ ∀! ! ∈ !! ⇔ ! ∈ !! ⇒ !"#$%&'()* !! ≥!"#$%&'()! !! .  
3. Invariants, although defined only once per class or object, are an intrinsic part 
of every contract and must be accounted as such. Thus, ∀!∀!!(! ∈ ! ∧ ! ∉!! ⇒ !! ! = ! !). 
4. Inherited specifications must be accounted as being part of the contract of the 
overriding method in the subclass, i.e., the contracts of the super-type are 
included in the contracts of the subtype. Therefore !! ≤ !! ⇒ !!!! ⊇ !!!!. 
5. The complexity of a clause should reflect the effort the developer spent in 
producing it. One way of accounting for this effort is to count the number of 
alternatives the developer needs to consider. The complexity of each disjunct 
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(i.e., alternative) also needs to be a factor and a way to estimate it is to count 
the number of conjuncts in them. Therefore, !! ∨,∧ ≥ !! ∨,∧ ∧ !! ∀,∃ =!! ∀,∃ ⇒ !"#$%&'()*(!!) ≥ !"#$%&'()*(!!). The number of quantifiers is 
assumed to be identical in both clauses as they add their own complexity.  
Following the approaches described in (Briand et al., 1996), the contract complexity 
measure is based on graph theory. In our case, this measure maps a contract to the control 
flow graph required to implement it in an imperative programming language. The idea is 
to transform a contract into an equivalent program and measure the complexity of that 
program (in fact, its control flow graph) using a well-established metric. We choose Java 
for obvious reasons but it could be easily defined for any other imperative programming 
language. We use the cyclomatic complexity of the resulting control flow graph as a 
measure of contract complexity.  
A detailed translation based on the JML grammar could be easily (but laboriously) 
described. Since this is not the focus of this paper, we present instead a simplified 
definition of a contract (analogous to method specifications and a subset of type 
specifications restricted to invariants as defined in (Leavens et al., 2009)) and the 
resulting program in  Table 2. The precondition, postcondition, wait_condition, invariant 
and predicate terminals in the simplified grammar are Boolean expressions. The non-
terminal quantifier is also a Boolean expression. The mapping for expressions is trivial 
(except for a quantifier, which is described on the table). The implication operator is 
translated into its semantically equivalent using the primitive operators available in 
typical programming languages (&&, ||, and ! for Java). The equivalence operator is 
translated to the equality test operator (==).  
Table 2: Mapping from a JML contract (top, in EBNF format) to a Java program 
(bottom). The contract definition is based on the structure above. 
contract::= [ invariants ] , [ spec_cases ] ; 
invariants::= { invariant } ; 
spec_cases::= { spec_casei } ; 
spec_casei::= [ preconditioni ] , [ postconditioni ] , [ wait_conditioni ] ; 
quantifier::= ‘(‘ , (“\forall” | “\exists”) , var_decl , ‘;’ , predicate1 , ‘;’ , predicate2 , ‘)’ ; 
boolean contract() { 
    if(!(invariant1 && invariant2 && … )) 
Carleton University, Technical Report SCE-13-04 September 2013 
32 
        return false; 
…     
    if(preconditioni)     { 
        if(!waitconditioni) 
            return false; 
        if(!postconditioni) 
            return false; 
    } 
… 
    return true; 
} 
 
boolean forall() { 
    var_decl; 
    while(predicate1) { 
        if(!predicate2) 
            return false; 
    }     
    return true; 
} 
 
boolean exists() { 
    var_decl; 
    while(predicate1) { 
        if(predicate2) 
            return true; 
    }     
    return false; 
} 
The contract complexity measure (CCM) of a contract is defined as the cyclomatic 
complexity (VG) of the Java program resulting from the mapping of the contract 
according to the rules in Table 2 minus the constant 1. The term -1 is necessary for an 
empty contract to have CCM equal to zero. Model methods with bodies and methods in 
specification-only pure classes can be referenced from clauses. Different methods 
perform different computations and should be accounted for according to their 
complexity. Therefore, !!" ! = !" ! , where m is a model method or a method in a 
specification-only pure class. This translates to a very simple rule for measuring the 
complexity of a contract M: 
 !!" ! = ! ∈ ! + ! ∨ + ! ∧ + ! ∀,∃!∈! + !"(!)!: ∀!∈! !∈! ,  
where ! iterates over clauses, ! iterates over model methods referenced in clauses4. This 
rule can be used to compute the CCM of a contract without having to explicitly translate 
it to a Java program (note that m is already a Java program). Specification inheritance is 
                                                            
4 Based on the simplified rules to compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function McCabe, T.J., 1976. 
Complexity Measure. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering SE-2, 308-320. (p.314-315). 
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trivially incorporated considering that inherited specifications behave as if they were 
defined in the overriding method (and type) (Leavens, 2006), which is reflected in the 
CCM properties 3 and 4 above. For instance, the CCM of the advanced contract of 
method open() of class Central can be computed by following the calculation 
described in Table 3. It yields a CCM of 27.  
Table 3: CCM of Central.open() (specification-only pure class Connection is 
not shown). 
Term CCM 
Number of clauses 7 
Invariant 1:  
(\forall Connection c; connections.contains(c); 
!peers.contains(c.peer1) && !peers.contains(c.peer2)) 
3 (2 from the quantifier 
+ 1 from the &&) 
Invariant 2:  
(\forall p; peers.contains(p); p.length() < 50) 2 (from the quantifier) 
Precondition 1: 
!aRemoteId.equals(aLocalId) && 
peers.contains(aRemoteId) && !connections.contains(new 
Connection(aRemoteId, aLocalId)) 
2 (from the &&) 
Postcondition1: 
\result.connection.equals(new Connection(aRemoteId, 
LocalId)) && !peers.contains(aRemoteId) && 
\result.connected && connections.contains(new 
Connection(aRemoteId, aLocalId)) 
















Model methods and pure classes: 
Connection methods (constructor, hashCode() and equals()) 
referenced in the contract 
8 (6 from equals() + 
1 from hashCode() + 1 
from Connection()) 
5.4 Experimental Design 
The experiment is designed to enable the measurement of observability and 
diagnosability of a program instrumented with contracts and determine how such 
measures are influenced by the complexity and level of sophistication of contracts. 
Moreover, the design takes into account the fact that such measurements are taken by 
                                                            
5 This clause is equivalent to signals (Exception e) e instanceof 
ConnectionRefusedException and does not contain a Boolean operator. Its presence is accounted for 
as one clause (top row). 
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injecting faults into a concurrent system, which is inherently non-deterministic and thus 
presents challenges in reproducing such faults. We start by describing how contracts are 
designed, followed by the procedure to collect the data (fault selection, injection and 
measurement procedures) and conclude with a definition of success. 
Contracts, according to the four types described in section 5.3.1, are specified for all 
methods of the classes and interfaces of the target system, to the maximum extent 
possible (i.e., describing the method’s behaviour with as much detail as possible based on 
the judgment of experimenter, an expert on the system). Having all contracts upfront, 
allows one to study their completeness from the start. Contracts are specified without 
modifying the code. This restriction is of fundamental importance to obtain realistic 
results as in practice the code would not be modified to facilitate contract specifications 
at the expense of performance or simplicity. An example would be increasing the scope 
of a lock by covering more statements in the method body to satisfy thread-safety 
requirements so that a more precise predicate can be stated. Doing so has the potential of 
negatively impacting the performance of the system.  
In total, 1536 methods were specified. There is, on average, one contract per 17.6 LOC. 
5.4.1 Experimental Procedure 
The target system with contracts is compiled with the RAC compiler and is then called 
the instrumented system. All contracts were designed prior to executing any experiment, 
including fault selection, to avoid biased results.  
The observability and diagnosability of the instrumented version of the system is 
measured using faults re-introduced from earlier versions, which may be detected through 
assertion violations. The faults to be injected are real and retrieved from Juniper’s bug 
database according to the following criteria: 
1. It is reproducible in the production system (i.e., detected by the standard test 
suite) 
2. It was originally discovered during system testing 
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3. It is located in the router driver subsystem or on a directly connected client so that 
the failure is detected due to the erroneous behaviour of the router driver 
subsystem 
4. It was originally discovered in a version to which no significant new functionality 
was added to the router driver subsystem as compared to the version used for 
conducting this experiment. 
Points 1 is self-explanatory. Point 2 is necessary to exclude faults reported by developers 
during development as our focus is system testing. Such faults are discovered during 
coding or unit testing. Point 3 is necessary to limit the scope of the study to the subsystem 
we selected for our empirical work and keep the effort of the study to a feasible level. 
Faults located in directly connected clients of the router are eligible since some locks 
need to (or must not) be acquired prior to executing operations in the router driver 
subsystem. It is expected that such faults be detected by the contracts of the methods in 
the interface objects since it is through those objects that clients interact with the router. 
Point 4 is required so that the contracts used to specify the subsystem remain valid (i.e., 
they do not need to be changed) in order to inject a fault present in an earlier version of 
the system. This is not merely a matter of effort in contract updating but a requirement to 
allow for the proper analysis of the results: the target system remains the same throughout 
the experiment, with the exception of the injected fault. Following these criteria, we 
selected a total of 139 functional faults. 
The decision to retrieve faults from the bug database serves two purposes: it eliminates 
the human factor in the fault selection process and it ensures that the faults are realistic.  
There is still the risk that such faults do not represent the complete spectrum of possible 
types of functional faults. However, given the complexity of the system under test, the 
fact that the system has been through multiple releases to a variety of customers and is 
operational in several networks supporting many different scenarios, it is reasonable to 
state that the vast majority of faults in the system have already been found. This 
conclusion is only possible because the feature set of the system under test did not change 
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over the period (releases) in which the faults were discovered (see point 4 of the selection 
criteria above).  
As described in the introduction of section 5, we want to analyze the limitations of the 
observability of a concurrent system instrumented with contracts and the characteristics 
of undetectable faults. We also want to determine the relation (if one exists) between the 
effort spent in designing contracts (measured in terms of contract type and complexity) 
and the global observability and diagnosability of a system instrumented with such 
contracts. With this information in hand, we want to offer practitioners recommendations 
to balance the effort in contract design with the yield in terms of global observability and 
diagnosability.  
The experimental procedure below describes how to best collect the data specified above. 
It must be noted that it is more interesting to be able to detect a fault with a contract of 
lower sophistication type since these are generally easier to specify and reduce the 
analysis effort. The procedure reflects this preference. It is also of fundamental 
importance that a fault manifests itself in the same way in both the original and the 
instrumented version of the system, as otherwise it is not possible to guarantee that the 
absence of faults in the instrumented version implies the absence of faults in the original 
version. The procedure also incorporates the necessary steps to identify any discrepancies 
in fault manifestation between the different versions of the system. 
The experimental procedure is as follows: 
1. Select a fault satisfying the criteria above and inject it in the instrumented 
(starting with the lowest level of sophistication) and the production versions of the 
system. 
2. Run both versions of the system through the test suite; the instrumented version 
should execute in a non-fatal assertion checking mode (i.e., assertion violations 
are simply logged instead of causing an exception to be raised). If both versions 
of the system exhibit failures on the same test cases, proceed to step 3. Otherwise 
go to step 4. 
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3. Run the instrumented version of the system (starting with the one instrumented 
with Basic contracts) through the test suite in regular mode (i.e., with assertion 
violations reported via thrown exceptions) 
a. If an assertion violation occurs, register the occurrence, record the type of 
contract that was able to detect the fault, and calculate the distance, 
weighed distance and diagnosis scope between the violated contract and 
the fault and go to step 4. 
b. If an assertion violation does not occur, update contracts, if possible, to 
detect the fault and restart step 3.  
c. If it is determined that the fault cannot be detected through a contract 
violation, inject the fault in the instrumented version of the system with a 
higher sophistication contract type and go to step 3. If there is no version 
of the system with a higher contract sophistication type, record this 
occurrence and go to step 4.  
4. Go to the next fault and go to step 1. If there are no more faults, stop.  
Regarding the iteration in step 3.b above, modifying a contract (or a set of contracts) to 
detect a specific fault cannot introduce incorrect specifications since the correct system in 
combination with the standard test suite can be used to determine the validity of the 
contract (the system is assumed correct prior to fault injection; see section 4). Such 
iteration will enable the determination of limitations in contract fault detection 
effectiveness (research question Q1) though in practice we can expect the effectiveness to 
be lower, to an extent depending on the developers’ skills. Furthermore, it also allows the 
determination of how incomplete the initial contracts are, thus contributing to answering 
research question Q5. 
5.4.2 Definitions of Success 
Success is assessed by the assertions’ detection rate of the injected faults and by the ease 
with which faults are diagnosed. Observability is measured by the fault detection rate and 
diagnosability by estimating the diagnosis effort in terms of the distance, weighed 
distance and diagnosis scope between the fault and the contract that detected it and 
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calculating the global diagnosability. The higher the observability and the diagnosability 
the more successful contracts are as test oracles. 
6  RESULTS 
The results and conclusions reported in this paper are based on a single though 
comprehensive industrial case study that is representative of concurrent systems in the 
telecommunications industry. This study should be replicated to allow for a wider 
generalization of results; our study methodology can be reused and possibly adapted for 
that purpose. 
We first report on observability and second on diagnosability. We then summarize the 
results and provide guidelines for balancing contract design effort with attainable 
observability and diagnosability. 
6.1.1 Observability: Descriptive statistics 
This section addresses research questions Q1 and Q2. 107 (77.3%) of the 139 selected 
functional faults were detected by the instrumented version of the system through 
contracts of different types (Figure 7). In other words, 22.7% of the faults are 
undetectable. The figure shows the contribution of original and updated contracts 
depending on their type. For instance, Basic, unchanged contracts detected 31.8% of the 
faults, moving to Elementary contracts did not increase detection, increasing the 
sophistication of contracts to the Intermediate level added to the detection (4.5% more 
faults) while the Advanced level did not improve detection over the Intermediate level. 
Updating Basic contracts increased detection by 10.6%, leading to a total detection of 
Basic contracts of 42.4%.  
Carleton University, Technical Report SCE-13-04 September 2013 
39 
 
Figure 7: System observability per contract type.  
These results allow us to make comparisons with previous studies. The overall detection 
rate of 77.3% is very close to the one reported in (Briand et al., 2003) (80%) and on the 
same ballpark of the one reported in (Baudry et al., 2000a) (87.5%). Despite such 
discrepancy, the same overall conclusion can be drawn: above a certain threshold, it is 
not worthwhile to invest in contract improvements (for observability purposes) since the 
detection rate does not improve significantly. In this study, the threshold seems to be 
contracts of intermediate sophistication since (1) the overall observability only increases 
by 1.5 percentage points with the use of advanced contracts and (2) the effort in 
designing an advanced contract is generally significantly higher than an intermediate one 
for the same method (assuming the method in question cannot be completely specified 
using an intermediate contract).  
6.1.1.1 Observability: impact of updating contracts 
Figure 7 shows that 47% of the detected faults were found without updating contracts 
(cumulative of contracts unchanged, i.e., 36.3 over 77.3). This can be interpreted as the 
ability of developers to produce contracts to be used as test oracles. This interpretation is 
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available, as described in section 5.3.1. Basic contracts were the ones that needed the 
least changes to detect additional faults since they are intuitive to design: 75% of faults 
detected by basic contracts are detected prior to changes (36.8 over 42.4). This should not 
be a surprise since they can only state predicates based on concrete fields and methods 
and cannot state properties of elements of collections, which would require the use of 
quantifiers. In other words, the language constraints make the contracts simple to write 
and unlikely to improve.   
The elementary contracts all had to be updated to enable them to detect additional faults 
(10.6% increment over Basic). This is because, to increase detection, they required the 
use of ghost fields to model behaviour spanning multiple objects, each of which were 
required to be in specific states. Such complex behaviour was not specified a priori since 
it was not intuitive to do so. A typical example is attempting to log a subscriber in 
(section 5.2) if, and only if, a default set of policies have been successfully applied on the 
interface terminating the traffic originating at a subscriber’s equipment. This behaviour is 
enforced implicitly by a set of objects but is not actually reflected in any concrete field of 
an object for direct verification anywhere. This is the type of behaviour that is not 
intuitive to capture since it requires a ghost field to be set in multiple objects (in this 
example by the objects executing the subscriber log in) so it can be read in different 
contracts (located in the object controlling the policy application in this instance). Model 
fields did not play a role since they are a convenience to model abstract behaviour 
already reflected in concrete fields and thus they do not enable the specification of any 
behaviour that is not possible to describe with basic contracts.  
The vast majority (80%) of intermediate contracts were updated. This is due to the 
difficulty to determine which properties of collections are important to specify in 
contracts and the effort required in doing so. The hardest task is to state the subset of 
elements to which a predicate must hold in case such predicate specifies a relation to 
other elements of the same or of a different set. Let us take the example of a transaction, 
which is a set of policy objects to be applied on a router. For any object of type 
PolicyList present in a transaction, there must be at least one object of type RuleSet 
associated with it in the same transaction in case these objects are being installed on the 
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device. There are many properties like this that require nested quantification (two in this 
example) and not all of them were deemed necessary when specifying the initial 
contracts. Additionally, not all of them helped improve fault detection in our study. 
We needed to update all the advanced contracts. Since this only resulted in a small 
increase in fault detection, we cannot provide a general explanation as we did for other 
types of contracts. However, we conjecture that, similarly to Elementary contracts, 
additional contracts useful for fault detection specify behaviours that are not intuitive to 
capture. 
6.1.1.2 Observability: undetectable faults 
As pointed out in (Baudry et al., 2000a), contracts describe some “important” behaviours 
but they are not expected to be a complete description of a method. The difficulty is 
therefore to determine which behaviour is important to specify. One aspect of this 
fundamental question is determining what contracts cannot detect (research question 4). 
Table 4 summarizes the reasons for failing to detect faults in our case study. Notice that 
these faults cannot be detected regardless of the effort employed in updating contracts. 
This conclusion is possible because the target system was assumed correct, the injected 
faults were known and the experimenter is an expert on the system. 
Table 4: Summary of reasons for failing to detect faults through contracts. 
Frequencies are relative to undetectable faults. 
Reason for non-detection Occurrence 
Safepoint constraints 6.7% 
Incorrect timeout 6.7% 
Parsing error 13.3% 
Missing functionality 20.0% 
Internal method state 53.3% 
Only 6.7% of the undetectable faults are a direct consequence of the constraints imposed 
by the use of safepoints (Araujo et al., 2008). These constraints prevent the specification 
of certain properties that would otherwise be able to detect such faults. These would be 
expressions referring to fields or parameters that would be subject to interference.  
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Using an incorrect value for a timeout scores the same: 6.7%. This type of error cannot be 
detected because it is a value that requires an agreement between two entities external to 
the program (e.g. processes, a process and the operating system) and any contract would 
just be referring to the same value the implementation refers to. If, however, the timeout 
is set by the program, then it is under its control and can therefore be checked. This type 
of occurrence is not considered undetectable and therefore excluded from this category.  
Parsing errors of communication protocol messages cover 13.3% of the cases. They are 
undetectable because the contract would have to fully describe the actual parsing routine, 
which is not realistic since, in practice, contracts should remain at a higher level of 
abstraction than the implementation they specify. Notice that we are not stating that it is 
not possible to define contracts for the parser itself (it was not done so since this 
functionality resides outside the router driver subsystem) but that, from a client 
perspective, stating the acceptable contents of a message is equivalent to writing the code 
that drives the parser.  
Missing functionality (e.g., unimplemented event handlers) accounts for 20% of the 
cases. Contracts cannot detect such faults unless an observable state change is required as 
a consequence of the missing statements in a method. For instance, if handling a 
particular type of message requires a subscriber to be logged out, a violation of such rule 
can be detected by a contract since it can specify which message types are acceptable 
when a subscriber is logged out. On the other hand, unobservable (or unpredictable) 
actions, like what happens while handling an event notifying the system of a 
configuration change, cannot be enforced to happen or not to happen: it would require  
some observable state change to be checked by such contract.  
Internal method state (e.g., failing to check for null) is the top ranking reason (53.3%) for 
failing to detect a fault. It is impossible for contracts to detect such situations since there 
is no property observable in the pre- or post-state of a method that would indicate or 
control whether certain actions are performed. For instance, in the case of accessing a 
field that is allowed to be null and failing to check for its nullity inside a method is not a 
detectable fault since observing a null value for such field is not an unexpected situation. 
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6.1.1.3 Summary 
In this section we studied the studied the impact of the contract sophistication in the 
ability of the system in detecting faults (i.e. observability). We have split the faults in two 
groups: detectable (77.3%) and undetectable (22.7%) by contracts. For the former, we 
noticed that updating contracts over multiple iterations is required to achieve higher 
observability. We also noticed that there is little gain in investing in advanced contracts 
over intermediate ones (only 1.5 percent points increase). We also noticed that 
intermediate contracts are indeed required to achieve a significantly higher observability 
compared to other contracts of lesser sophistication. Regarding undetectable faults, we 
classified them into different groups to study their nature. Only 6.7% of such faults are 
undetectable because of the limitations of the contract specification language (JML), 
namely the safepoints construct. All the others are a consequence to the intrinsic nature of 
contracts as test oracles, namely that they can only observe states prior and post method 
execution, and that they should work at a higher level of abstraction than the method. The 
only remedy to such cases is to design manual test oracles to cover such behaviour.  
6.1.2 Contract complexity vs. faults 
We first attempt to identify a relation between the Contract Complexity Measure (CCM) 
(section 5.3.1) of a contract detecting a fault and the complexity of the method it specifies 
(research question Q3). A generic approach to determine the contents of a contract based 
on their complexity relates a structural property of contracts (the CCM) to a structural 
property of methods (MacCabe’s cyclomatic complexity or VG) and the global 
observability such contracts achieve. This allows one to derive guidelines for contract 
content (research question Q5) independently of the behaviour of a method. In other 
words, the goal is to determine what CCM value to expect based on the corresponding 
method’s complexity and the targeted observability.   
Table 5 depicts the relation between the cyclomatic complexity (VG) of a method and the 
CCM of the most complex contract detecting a fault in the method. Methods are grouped 
in buckets of size 2 according to their VG (omitted buckets for methods whose contracts 
did not detect any faults).  
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Table 5: Method Cyclomatic Complexity Histogram and associated Maximum 













2 71.3% 5 24 97.6% 14 
4 84.6% 12 26 97.9% 18 
6 89.8% 12 30 98.3% 24 
8 91.6% 20 32 98.6% 6 
10 93.4% 23 34 98.8% 11 
12 94.3% 13 38 99.2% 13 
14 95.1% 20 50 99.7% 10 
16 95.8% 13 60 99.9% 35 
20 96.9% 13 More 100.0%  
Table 5 shows that there is no simple relation between VG and CCM. It shows that 
simple methods (VG ≤ 6) have simple contracts (CCM ≤ 12) that are capable of detecting 
faults. It also shows that very complex methods (VG > 50) can have very complex 
contracts (CCM > 30), which is intuitive. It also shows that the vast majority of contracts 
have a CCM smaller than 25. These observations do not allow any further conclusions 
regarding the relation between a method’s complexity and its contract complexity.    
Our next research question is to investigate the relation (if one exists) between the effort 
spent in designing contracts (i.e., their level of detail) and their ability to detect and 
diagnose faults. Figure 8 shows the cumulative value of the fault detection percentage as 
contract CCM increases. It also shows the distribution of detected faults per CCM of the 
detecting contracts, which we will use to support some of our conclusions. For the proper 
interpretation of this graph one must keep in mind that a contract’s level of detail (and 
therefore its CCM) is at the will of the designer and, as a consequence, CCM cannot be 
used to classify methods in the same manner that VG is used. Specifically, VG is an 
intrinsic property of each method whereas CCM reflects the behaviour of the method that 
was deemed important by the designer, e.g., a method computing a statistical test may 
have a complex control flow (and therefore a high VG) though its postcondition may 
simply state that the result is in range [0,1] (i.e., very low CCM). Moreover, a contract 
may reflect the behaviour of the method being specified (which may have a low VG) in 
conjunction with other methods it calls (resulting in a high CCM). 
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Figure 8: Histogram of faults per detecting contracts’ CCM. 
The histogram in Figure 8 shows that 80% of the observed faults can be detected by the 
set of contracts with CCM up to 14. Contracts of CCM up to 20 detected 90% of 
detectable faults whereas a CCM up to 24 detected 96% of them. Given the low precision 
due to the relatively small population of faults, the CCM to attain the 96 percentile could 
be safely chosen as 30, the midpoint between 24 and 34, the limits of such interval. This 
threshold could be used as a guideline to a CCM upper-bound, i.e. when to stop 
specifying. It should not be used, however, as a goal for all methods since for most 
simple methods (i.e., those with VG ≤ 6) the CCM remains below 12 (see Table 5). It 
does apply, however, to most methods with VG > 6, for which contracts with CCM ≥ 20 
are common, irrespective of the method’s VG. Methods with VG > 38 are very rare (less 
than 1%), however, due to their complexity, they are very likely to be faulty (we 
observed more than one fault in each such method) and, therefore, an effort in designing 
complex contracts for them is not only affordable but has a high chance of paying off.  
The choice of the VG and CCM thresholds is ultimately based on the effort required to 
design the contracts, the available resources and the desired levels of observability. 
Figure 9 displays the cumulative distribution of detected faults over CCM values for 
different types of contract. 100% represents the total number of faults detected by 
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means a global observability of 73% (96% of 75.8%, the global observability achieved if 
all contracts are taken into account; see Figure 7) whilst it means an observability of 41% 
for basic contracts (96% of 42.4%; see Figure 7). It shows that 97.1% of faults detected 
by both basic and elementary contracts were found by contracts with a CCM up to 14. 
Given that basic contracts are much easier to design than intermediate ones, one may 
choose to restrict contracts to be of the basic type and, therefore, should define a CCM 
upper bound of 14. 
 
Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of detected faults per detecting contracts’ CCM 
for different types of contracts.  
6.1.3 Diagnosability 
Any contract content recommendation should also be based on its effect on fault 
diagnosability. Table 6 compares the statistics for global diagnosability obtained from the 
three different measures of diagnostic effort (section 5.1). A Spearman correlation test 
reveals that the correlation coefficient between each pair of measures is greater than 0.99, 
thus indicating they are for all practical purposes equivalent measures of diagnosability. 
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Undetected faults comprise undetectable faults (22.7% of all faults, section 6.1.1) and the 
faults not detected by contracts of a particular type. The increase of the diagnosability 
mean with the increment in contract sophistication if the population includes the 
undetected faults (Table 6, column 1) demonstrates an overall diagnosability 
improvement with increased contract complexity. The converse behaviour if the 
population does not include the undetected faults (Table 6, column 2) demonstrates that 
the incrementally detected faults are harder to diagnose. 
Table 6: Statistics for global diagnosability for contracts of different types obtained 
through varied measures of diagnostic effort. 
 All Faults Detected Faults Only 





Basic 0.41 0.52 0.95 0.92 
Elementary 0.51 0.53 0.94 0.90 
Intermediate 0.70 0.60 0.91 0.86 
Distance 
Basic 0.42 0.52 0.97 0.95 
Elementary 0.52 0.52 0.96 0.94 
Intermediate 0.72 0.60 0.94 0.91 
Weighed 
Distance 
Basic 0.41 0.52 0.96 0.92 
Elementary 0.51 0.52 0.95 0.91 
Intermediate 0.71 0.60 0.92 0.88 
Global diagnosability does not reflect one important detail: the percentage of faults 
located in the same method as the detecting contract. Table 7 displays these percentages 
per contract type; the second column considers only the detected faults for a particular 
contract type whilst the first considers all the faults, including the undetected ones. It 
shows that the vast majority of faults, irrespective of the contract type, are detected by the 
postcondition of the method containing the fault. This aligns with the results from 
Briand’s study (Briand et al., 2003). Further comparisons of the numerical results is 
impossible since they used a variant of the distance measure that is not equivalent to the 
one used in this work. Furthermore, as with global diagnosability, increasing contract 
sophistication increases the number of faults detected in the same method as the contract 
postcondition, but the incrementally detected faults are more likely (although not a lot 
more) to be detected by a contract of another method. 
Table 7: Percentage of faults located in the same method as the detecting contract.  
 All Faults Detected Only 
Basic 35% 82% 
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Elementary 41% 77% 
Intermediate 58% 76% 
As with observability, diagnosability improves significantly with the successive 
increment in contract complexity (see Figure 10), thus allowing one to establish a cause 
and effect relation between observability and diagnosability and, therefore, to estimate 
the gains in diagnosability based on the effort spent on contract design. This aligns 
generally with the theoretical diagnosability model in (Le Traon et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 10: Global diagnosability as a function of global observability. 
6.1.4 Discussion and Summary 
This case study arrived at the following conclusions: 
1. Overall, observability increases with the increase of contract sophistication. 
2. The use of advanced contracts (those containing specially crafted classes to model 
abstract behaviour) does not increase the observability significantly if compared 
to intermediate contracts (1.5% increase only, based on Figure 7). 
3. Observability is limited to about 76% if contracts are restricted to the intermediate 
type, whereas it is limited to about 42% for basic contracts. 
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4. Achieving higher observability is only possible with the use of manually coded 
test oracles targeted at the behaviours displayed by undetectable faults by 
contracts (Table 4).  
5. A system with contracts with maximum CCM values of 20 and 30 can detect 90% 
and 96%, respectively, of all faults. 
6. Contracts with CCM ≤ 12 suffice to specify methods with VG ≤ 6. 
7. More complex methods with VG in range [7, 38] are the ones that should have 
contracts with CCM between 20 and 30. 
8. Methods with VG > 38 are rare and likely faulty thus offering a high chance of 
payoff to contracts. Therefore, their contracts should be unrestricted in terms of 
CCM.  
9. The three measures of diagnostic effort presented in this paper are statistically 
equivalent. 
10. Global diagnosability has a linear relation to global observability, allowing one to 
determine the relative effort in diagnosing faults as a function of the targeted 
observability, which is a function of the contract complexity. 
Based on these conclusions, to use contracts as a test oracle in a concurrent system, each 
contract should possess the following properties to be both effective and efficient (not 
unnecessarily complex): 
A. Be of type intermediate if required to specify the method’s behaviour but never of 
type advanced for methods with VG ≤ 38. 
B. Have a CCM ≈ 12 if the method has a VG ≤ 6. There are cases in which 
invariants are inherently complex due to other methods in the class, thus 
providing simple methods with a CCM close to 12 solely through invariants. In 
such cases, the recommendation is to still specify preconditions and 
postconditions based on properties unrelated to invariants such as predicates 
involving parameters and return values. Simply not providing a contract for a 
method in this case will certainly leave faults related to parameters and return 
values go undetected.  
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C. Have a CCM ≈ 30 for methods with VG in range [7, 38]. This threshold targets an 
observability around 75% and thus a diagnosability of around 0.70 (Figure 10). 
This means that it will reduce the diagnosis effort to only 30% compared to a 
system without contracts. More importantly, however, is that in the worst case, 
i.e., a complex fault only detectable by an intermediate contract, the average effort 
in diagnosing such fault will be less than 9% of the execution thread (a 
diagnosability of 0.91 from Table 6), thus showing a tenfold improvement 
compared to an un-instrumented system.  
D. For methods with VG > 38, their contracts can have a larger CCM than mandated 
by the requirements above whilst having manual oracles focusing on the 
undetectable behaviours, namely message parsing, time dependant actions, or that 
manipulate a lot of state kept in the context of the method (i.e., local variables).  
The CCM and VG thresholds above should be chosen based on the availability of 
resources to design the contracts and the desired global observability and diagnosability. 
The graph in Figure 9 can be used to relate the desired observability to the CCM 
threshold. The VG upper limit (38 in this analysis) should be chosen based on actual data 
collected for the target system (the 99 percentile for this study, as shown in Table 5). 
These guidelines are a starting point and can only be deemed generic based on the 
assumption that our target system is representative of industrial concurrent systems. 
Replications of our study are of course necessary.  
Even if one follows these guidelines, there is a chance that detectable faults will still go 
undetected. This is evidenced by the significant number of contracts (about 53%) that 
required improvement to detect additional faults (section 6.1.1.1). However, given that 
the guidelines previously discussed were based on data collected after contracts were 
updated, which caused CCM increases, it is expected that the need to update contracts 
will be significantly lower in practice. In a similar manner to standard methodologies in 
which test cases (and test oracles implicitly) are updated as new faults are discovered, 
contracts should also be updated. This will increase the system’s global observability and, 
consequently, its global diagnosability. More research is required to evaluate the 
continued use (i.e. across multiple evolving releases) of contracts as test oracles in 
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industrial systems to identify the gains in comparison to current methods based on 
manually coded test oracles. 
The biggest threat to the generality of these recommendations is whether the structural 
properties of the chosen system are typical of a larger class of concurrent industrial 
systems. The method cyclomatic complexity distribution is expected to vary across 
systems. The effect of such a variation is unknown but it is expected that the 
recommended VG thresholds above would need to be adjusted. This would likely affect 
the upper end (38 in this case) to the 99 percentile of the actual target system. The CCM 
thresholds should, however, be less sensitive to such changes since even simple contracts 
can detect faults in highly complex methods.  
7 CONCLUSION 
Different solutions to the problem of applying Design by Contract to concurrent software 
have been proposed. A complete solution requires being able to (1) specify the behaviour 
of interest in the form of contracts in a suitable language, (2) translate such contracts into 
runtime assertion checking code, and (3) embed such code into the program being 
specified (instrumentation). One important use of executable contracts is to serve as 
automated test oracles. For any result obtained with the instrumented system to apply to 
the original one, both systems must be behaviourally equivalent, i.e., the runtime 
assertion checking code must not produce any side-effects that would cause faults present 
in one system not to manifest in the other. Contracts are also required to be effective at 
detecting and diagnosing concurrent faults such as deadlocks and race conditions as well 
as functional faults in a concurrent environment. Having addressed all the other points in 
previous work (Araujo et al., 2008) (Araujo et al., 2011a) (Araujo et al., 2011b), this 
paper focuses on the detection and diagnosis of functional faults. 
We identified the challenges of applying DbC to concurrent software as well as the 
solutions we proposed in previous work. We also summarized the results of our previous 
work in demonstrating the ability of a RAC compiler enhanced with our concurrent 
contracts extensions to produce instrumented programs that can be used in place of their 
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production versions (i.e., they are equivalent) during the system test phase, thus allowing 
one to conclude that the occurrence of faults in one version corresponds to the occurrence 
of faults in the other. Finally, we also recapitulated the results of our previous work 
stating that concurrent contracts are very effective in guaranteeing freedom from 
interference, which, combined with the equivalence result, ensures the validity of the 
results obtained. 
In this paper, the effectiveness of concurrent contracts as test oracles was evaluated with 
respect to functional faults. Effectiveness was characterized in terms of two measures: the 
global observability, which is the probability of oracles detecting faults, and the global 
diagnosability, which is the average effort to diagnose faults normalized with the size of 
an execution thread. This study was performed with a representative concurrent industrial 
software system following a precise and objective experimental methodology, which is 
also a contribution of this work. We categorized contracts based on their level of 
sophistication and defined a measure of contract complexity named Contract Complexity 
Measure (CCM). We also defined a procedure for injecting faults and obtaining the 
measures above from the detecting contracts, which may require updates to detect such 
faults.  
Likely the most significant contribution of this work was to create a set of clear and 
objective guidelines that contracts should satisfy to be effective test oracles, balancing the 
availability of resources to spend in designing contracts with the payoff in increased fault 
detection and decreased diagnosis effort. Such guidelines are based on structural 
properties of the contract and the code being specified. We used MacCabe’s cyclomatic 
complexity as the code structural property and the CCM as the contract structural 
property. By following such guidelines, we showed a concurrent system instrumented 
with concurrent contracts can detect about 75% of all functional faults and that the global 
effort to perform fault diagnosis is reduced by about 70%. More importantly, however, is 
that the diagnosis effort is reduced by about 90% for the faults that are detected by 
contracts, a tenfold improvement over systems without contract instrumentation. The 
guidelines were derived assuming our case study is representative of concurrent industrial 
systems. Replications of this study are of course necessary. 
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This work focused on Java as the system programming language and the Java Modeling 
Language (JML) as the language to define contracts. We believe, however, that our 
contributions are applicable to other object-oriented programming and specification 
languages. Having addressed the problems of specification and instrumentation of 
concurrent programs, and showing that concurrent and functional faults can be detected 
by instrumented concurrent software, we showed how Design by Contract can be 
effectively applied to concurrent object-oriented systems. 
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